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Articles
MARKET WORK AND FAMILY WORK
IN THE 21ST CENTURY*
JOAN WILLIAS**
I. INTRODUCTION
A S we gather together to remember and celebrate the work of Mary
Joe Frug, we can start by noting how little has changed since Mary
Joe wrote her groundbreaking article on labor market hostility towards
working mothers in 1979.1 "The labor force is organized as if workers do
not have family responsibilities. The traditional work schedule is both too
inflexible and too long for a parent with primary child care responsibil-
ity."2 The problem has not changed. Nor has the accepted wisdom that
discrimination law offers few weapons to challenge the problem of work/
family conflict.
3
Today I will contest some long-accepted assertions. My talk draws on
MaryJoe's work not only through its subject, but also through its method-
ology. For she broke ground not only in defining work/family conflict as
a major feminist issue;4 her work on postmodernism also showed what in-
* This Article is dedicated to my cherished colleague Peter Cicchino, in
celebration of his cheer and grace. It derives from a speech at the Thirty-Third
Annual Villanova Law Review Symposium honoring the late Mary Joe Frug on
November 7, 1998, entitled Still Hostile After All These Years? Gender, Work & Family
Revisited. Related material appears in JOAN WILLLAMs, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY
FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT, 1-6, 13-15, 64-113 (1999).
** Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. B.A.
Yale University. J.D. Harvard University. I would like to thank Ellie Somoza and
Rachel Dempsey for expert research assistance and Dean Mark Sargent and
Professor Ruth Gordon for the invitation to work with them on this Symposium.
1. See generally Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hos-
tility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REv. 55 (1979).
2. Id. at 56.
3. See id. at 66-67 (discussing "obvious and foreseeable" limitations on role
that Title VII can play in regulation of employment policies that restrict opportuni-
ties of individuals with children); see also Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and
the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1186 (1989) (stating
that victories for women under Title VII have not secured all gains for which wo-
men had hoped); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the
Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 791 (1989).
4. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Perspectives on the Ideological Impact of Legal
Education upon the Profession, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1259, 1262 n.ll (1994) (describing
Professor Frug's work as "one of the first serious feminist examinations of how the
contemporary workplace favors men"); Judith G. Greenberg, The Pregnancy Discrim-
ination Act: Legitimating Discrimination Against Pregnant Women in the Workforce, 50
(305)
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novative theory offers to legal scholars by way of weapons for feminist
change. 5 Using weapons from philosophy, I return to the issue of work/
family conflict and propose a paradigm shift, arguing that this conflict re-
flects not only hostility to working mothers, but also constitutes discrimina-
tion against women.
I want to start out today with an analysis of the basic structure of our
gender arrangements through a discussion of several children's books by
Lois Lowry. I will then document the contours of our gender system
(called domesticity) and propose a paradigm shift that allows us to see
work/family conflict as discrimination against women. I will end by
sketching several new causes of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19646 and the Equal Pay Act (EPA). 7
II. THE DREAMs WE CHOOSE TO DREAM
I begin with Lois Lowry's charming series about a ten to fourteen-
year-old girl named Anastasia Krupnik.8 These books, published between
1979 and the mid-1990s to rave reviews from both critics and children,
remain very popular with girls Anastasia's age. 9 They have framed my
ME. L. REv. 225, 229 n.25 (1998) (referring to Professor Frug's work as "the classic
discussion of the way in which workplace structures affect women's lives"); LindaJ.
Lacey, Mimicking the Words, but Missing the Message: The Misuse of Cultural Feminist
Themes in Religion and Family Law Jurisprudence, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1, 33 n.213 (1993)
(stating that "[the] call for a massive restructuring of the workplace, is a major
theme of much of feminist jurisprudence" and citing Professor Frug's work in this
regard); Pierre Schlag, In Memorium: Mary Joe Frug, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 435, 435
n.1 (1991) (stating that "MaryJoe Frug's SecuringJob Equality for Women: LaborMar-
ket Hostility to Working Mothers is one of the earliest among those articles that would
later come to be known as 'feminist jurisprudence"') (citation omitted).
5. See Schlag, supra note 4, at 435 (discussing Frug's work on legal
postmodernism).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994).
8. See generally Lois LowRy, ANASTASIA KRUPNIK (1979) [hereinafter LowRy,
ANASTASIA]; Lois LowRY, ANASTASIA AGAIN! (1981) [hereinafter LowRY, AGAIN];
Lois LowRY, ANASTASIA AT YOUR SERVICE (1982) [hereinafter LowRY, SERVICE]; Lois
LowRY, ANASTASIA ASK YOUR ANALYST (1984) [hereinafter LowRy, ANALYST]; Lois
LowRY, ANASTASIA ON HER OWN (1985) [hereinafter LowRy, ON HER OWN]; Lois
LowRy, ANASTASIA HAS THE ANswERs (1986) [hereinafter LowRY, ANSWERS]; Lois
LowRY, ANASTASIA'S CHOSEN CAREER (1987) [hereinafter LowRY, CAREER]; Lois
LowRy, ANASTASIA AT THIS ADDRESS (1991) [hereinafter LowRY, ADDRESS]; Lois
LowRy, ANASTASIA, ABSOLUTELY! (1995) [hereinafter LowRy, ABSOLUTELY].
9. See, e.g., Dana Flora Cadwell, Prize-Winning Lois Lowry Lures Middle-School Set,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, April 12, 1998, at C4. One critic notes the series'
popularity:
Lois Lowry's books are easy to locate on the revolving racks in the school
library.... They wear the look of books that have been in every backpack
and backpocket in the building. . . . In a word, they are loved ...
Through skill and intuitive feel for the young mind, Lowry has struck a
vein of literary gold. She writes the books that teachers want kids to read
and that kids want their friends to read.
[Vol. 44: p. 305306
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daughter's childhood in much the same way Laura Ingalls Wilder's Little
House books framed my own.
The political implications of the vision projected by the Little House
books has been the subject of intensive study; the Anastasia books offer
equally important insights.' 0 Like the Little House books, the Anastasia se-
ries sketches an optimistic and reassuring image of womanhood and an
idealized picture of middle-class family life. Anastasia's father, Myron, is a
Harvard English professor who conveys a love of books, poetry and intel-
lectual life. 1' Her mother is a prize-winning illustrator of children's books
who consistently receives desirable commissions. 12
If the Krupnik family sends the message that all adults are entitled to
successful careers, it also sends the message that this entitlement has little
impact on family life. For though Anastasia's mother has a rewarding ca-
reer, she also does everything traditionally expected of a housewife. Mar-
ried to a man ten years older, she had her first child at twenty-five.1 3 Now,
twelve years later, she greets Anastasia's little brother Sam when he returns
from nursery school and makes him a hot dog for lunch. 14 She paints
again during his naptime, but when he is awake she plays with him. 15 She
is in charge of getting Sam up in the morning, getting him dressed, get-
ting Anastasia up, doing the laundry and doing the grocery shopping. 16
In other words, she does virtually all of the child care.
10. See generally LAURA INGALLS WILDER, LITTLE HOUSE IN THE BIG WOODS
(1932); LAURA INGALLS WILDER, FARMER Boy (1933); LAURA INGALLS WILDER, THE
LrrLE HOUSE ON THE PRAIRIE (1935); LAURA INGALLS WILDER, ON THE BANKS OF
PLUM CREEK (1937); LAURA INGALLS WILDER, BY THE SHORES OF SILVER LAKE (1939);
LAURA INGALLS WILDER, THE LONG WINTER (1940); LAURA INGALLS WILDER, LITTLE
TowN ON THE PRAIRIE (1941); LAURA INGALLS WILDER, THESE HAPPY GOLDEN YEARS
(1943). This eight-volume series has been referred to as one of the few good histo-
ries of women written for children. SeeJennifer L. Hochschild, The Word American
Ends in "Can": The Ambiguous Promise of the American Dream, 34 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 139, 150 (1992) (commenting on "American dream" and LITTLE HOUSE se-
ties); Sue Stauffacher, A Woman's Place... With Ingenuity, Drive and Courage, Women
Earn Spot in History, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, March 15, 1998, at L7 (reporting on book
series).
11. See, e.g., LowRy, ANASTASIA, supra note 8, at 2 ("Anastasia's father, Dr. My-
ron Krupnik, was a professor of literature and had read just about every book in
the world .... He was also a poet. Sometimes he read his poems to Anastasia by
candlelight, and let her take an occasional (very small) sip of his wine."); LoWRY,
ANswERS, supra note 8, at 85 (describing Mr. Krupnik's criticism of school-assigned
poems and his complaint, "Why don't they assign you something great to
memorize.").
12. See LowRy, ADDRESS, supra note 8, at 3 (noting mother's profession);
LowRy, ON HER OWN, supra note 8, at 30-34.
13. See LowRy, ANASTASIA, supra note 8, at 21 (revealing Anastasia to be ten,
her mother to be thirty-five and her father to be forty-five when Anastasia's parents
announce her mother is pregnant).
14. See LowRy, ANALYST, supra note 8, at 16.
15. See LowRy, ON HER OWN, supra note 8, at 17.
16. See id.
1999] 307
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She also does virtually all of the housework. 17 This allocation of work
is presented as unproblematic for much of the series. It becomes con-
tested on only two occasions. I will focus on the first.18 "Once, several
years ago, [Anastasia's] parents had had a huge fight about sewing ....
Having just pricked her finger, [Anastasia's mother] announces, 'This is
the most sexist household in Cambridge *... Why is it the wife gets stuck
with the sewing? Myron, you do some of the cooking. Will you tell me one
good reason why you don't sew?' "19
"Because I don't know how," Dr. Krupnik had said, chewing on his
pipe.20
"I'll teach you, then."21
"Thank you, but I don't want to know how to sew."22
"In that case, thank you," she retorts, "but I don't want to do any laundry
anymore. Ever."23 He answers: "In that case, I don't think I want to be an
English professor anymore. I have always, if you must know, wanted to be
a beachcomber. So I think that from now on I will walk on empty
beaches-all alone by the way-and recite poetry to myself. Of course
that means there will be no more paychecks." 24 Anastasia scurries from
the room, terrified, only to return to find her father sewing the button on
his shirt, with her mother, giggling, with his pipe in her mouth. 25 "Since
then, her mother had always done all the sewing. Anastasia couldn't fig-
ure it OUt."
2 6
Maybe we can. Note how Mrs. Krupnik's proposal to redistribute
household work is interpreted as a refusal to shoulder the kinds of bur-
dens that keep the family together. To Anastasia it is terrifying; it is
presented as a fast track to family breakdown and child abandonment.
The proposal also triggers a direct statement by her father that her
mother's contribution of household work is balanced by his paycheck.
This is the old breadwinner/housewife bargain, legally enforceable at
common law, which now persists as a matter of social custom. 27 We feel
intuitively that "we've come a long way baby," but a brief look at some
statistics shows we haven't come so very far at all. American women still do
17. See id.
18. The second time, the only task shifted to Anastasia's father is that he will
now make his bed. See id. at 15.
19. See LowRy, AGAIN, supra note 8, at 77.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 78.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge,Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1058 (1989) (discussing common law obligation of family
breadwinner to support family).
308 [Vol. 44: p. 305
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss3/2
MARKET WORK & FAMILY WORK
eighty percent of child care and two-thirds of the housework.28 Most mar-
ried men still are perceived as the breadwinners, even if their wives also
work.29 Lowry communicates these sociological facts deftly-after a face-
saving role reversal that implies that a man sewing is as incongruous as a
woman smoking a pipe, Anastasia's mother retreats into coquettishness
("giggling") and yields to the old ways.
Thereafter, Mrs. Krupnik continues doing all the work of a traditional
housewife, even as she is referred to as a "professional woman." 30 She is
never depicted as having had to make contacts or build a network (when
she was twenty-five with an infant); instead her career seems to have fallen
into her lap.3 1 To anyone who has actually had to put the time into mak-
28. SeeJOHN P. ROBINSON & GEOFFREY GODBEY, TIME FOR LIFE: THE SURPRISING
WAYS AMERICANS USE THEIR TIME 105 tbl.3 (1997) (charting trends in family care,
by gender and employment, in hours per week for those aged 18-64 from 1965-
1985 in United States); see also Erik Olin Wright et al., The Non-Effects of Class on the
Gender Division of Labor in the Home: A Comparative Study of Sweden and the United
States, 6 GENDER & Soc'Y 252, 262-63, 266-67 (1992) (presenting basic distribution
of husbands' percentage contribution to housework as reported by male and fe-
male respondents in United States and Sweden). Not surprisingly, considerable
controversy exists about how much family work men do. Studies based on self-
reporting are notoriously unreliable. One study found that when women report
their husbands' contribution, they indicate that men do about twenty-five percent
less than when men report their own contributions. See id. at 260 (describing per-
ceived exaggeration by men). Another study also found high levels of over-report-
ing; high-status men tend to exaggerate their level of contribution the most and
the reporting gap is so high it overshadows the small increases in husbands' house-
work observed in recent years. SeeJulie E. Press & Eleanor Townsley, Wives' and
Husbands' Housework Reporting: Gender, Class, and Social Desirability, 12 GENDER &
Soc'Y 188, 203, 208 (1998) (examining reporting gaps in husband housework
hours). Studies based on self-reporting include the influential reports of the Fami-
lies and Work Institute, one of which announced to much fanfare in 1998 that
men are assuming a bigger share of the work at home. See Tamar Lewin, Men
Assuming Bigger Share At Home, New Survey Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1998, at A18
(discussing Family and Work Institute Study which shows gradual convergence in
way men and women in workforce use their time). Note that some men do much
more than others; it is important that men who do a lot recognize that they are
being penalized along with the women. It is not in their interest to overestimate
the amount of household work done by the large majority of men doing very little.
When Arlie Hochschild interviewed fifty men in the 1980s, she found that 80% did
not share household work or child care at all. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE
SECOND SHirr 173 (1997) (reporting results of her study). It appears that fathers'
family work increases most when they and their wives work split shifts, or when the
wives work weekends and evenings. See Carol S. Wharton, Finding Time for the "Sec-
ond Shift": The Impact of Flexible Work Schedules on Women's Double Days, 8 GENDER &
Soc'v 189, 190 (1994) (citing Brayfield & Hofferth's study).
29. See Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Address-
ing the Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13J.L. & POL. 241, 280 (1997) (discussing
"sexist" stereotype in which husband is viewed as primary breadwinner and work-
ing wife is mere discretionary earner).
30. See LOWRy, CAREER, supra note 8, at 57 (describing Anastasia's mother as
professional woman).
31. See LoWRy, ADDRESS, supra note 8, at 3; LowRy, ON HER OWN, supra note 8,
at 30, 31, 39; LOwRy, CAREER, supra note 8, at 16.
1999]
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ing opportunities happen, it is all a bit of a mystery. Indeed, it is a bit of a
mystery to Anastasia when, in Anastasia's Chosen Career, she interviews a
book store owner for a school paper on what she wants to be when she
grows up.
Anastasia's father puts her in touch with Mrs. Page, who once gave
him a book party. 32 Anastasia finds that she has a suitable job for a wo-
man-she runs a bookstore out of her basement. The store has high re-
pute but few customers; Mrs. Page seems to give away as many books as she
sells. 33 Anastasia wonders how she survives:
I don't mean to be rude or anything, but how do you make any
money? I mean my dad said that you gave forty-seven people
wine and cheese and only sold three books, and now you tell me
that you let people return books with coffee spilled on them, and
you tell them to buy records, and you send them to other book-
stores, and I don't see how- . . .. 4
A man's voice interrupted their conversation.. "Barb?"3 5
"What, honey?" the bookstore owner called back.36
"Where's yesterday's Wall Street Journal?" the man called. 37
"On your desk. You left it there last night," Barbara Page
replied. Turning to Anastasia, she continues, "That's how I pay
the rent. There isn't any rent. We own the whole building-my
husband and 1."38
"Oh."3
9
"You look disappointed."40
"No," Anastasia said, "not disappointed. Just confused." 4 1
No wonder. Young girls, in this book and many others, are presented with
a picture that does not compute.
That is precisely these books' importance. They tell young girls not
the way things are but the dreams we want to dream. Our job today is to
break through this dreamworld, first through a description of the world
we actually live in, and then through a description of how to change it to a
world that makes more sense.
32. See LowRy, CAREER, supra note 8, at 52 (introducing Barbara Page).
33. See id. at 54-56 n.34-41, 58 (describing Barbara Page's bookstore and her
business practices).
34. Id. at 55.
35. Id. at 56.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
[Vol. 44: p. 305
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III. THE WORLD WE LIvE IN: DOMESTICITY
The common assumption is that we live in the era of "the demise of
domesticity in America." 42 Domesticity is a gender system comprised of
both a particular organization of market work and family work and of the
gender norms that justify, sustain and reproduce it.43 Before roughly
1780, market work and family work were not sharply separated in space or
time.44 By the late eighteenth century this way of life was changing-do-
mesticity set up the system of men working in factories and offices, while
women (in theory) stayed behind to rear children and tend to "home
sweet home."4 5
Domesticity remains the entrenched, almost unquestioned, American
norm and practice. 46 As a gender system it has two defining characteris-
tics. The first is its organization of market work around the ideal of a
worker who works full-time and overtime and takes little or no time off for
childbearing or childrearing.47 Although this ideal-worker norm does not
define all jobs today, it defines most of the desirable ones-full-time blue-
collar jobs in the working-class context and high-level executive and pro-
42. See, e.g., Alice-Kessler Harris & Karen Brodkin Sacks, The Demise of Domestic-
ity in America, in WOMEN, HOUSEHOLDS AND THE ECONOMY 65 (Lourdes Beneria &
Catherine R. Stimpson eds., 1987) (stating that domesticity is on decline because
women's access to wages, job supply and business opportunity has improved).
43. See Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1559, 1567-69 (1991) (discussing domesticity's affiliation/achieve-
ment dichotomy, which legitimizes and re-enforces work and family roles based on
gender) [hereinafter Williams, Gender Wars].
44. See NANCY F. CoTr, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: WOMAN'S SPHERE IN NEW
ENGLAND, 1780-1835 63-74 (1977) (identifying 1780 as year when market and fam-
ily work began to become separate entities); Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 43,
at 1566 ("Whereas traditional society interspersed leisure, family life, and work,
modern society isolates "work" from family life both temporally and
geographically.").
45. See Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492, 509-
10 (1993) (describing ideology that men belong in market and women at home);
Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 43, at 1581 n.126 (stating that domesticity is so
tied with gender-training in femininity that many women identify with its norms);
Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Femi-
nism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 190-200 (1982) (describing ideology that women
belong at home, but men belong in market).
46. See Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and
Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REv. 855, 869 (1988) ("Whether because of sex discrimination,
the division of marital responsibilities, or individual differences in ability, ambi-
tion, education, training, or social encouragement, husbands are likely to earn
more than their working wives.... [and] women continue to assume a larger share
of the family's domestic responsibilities . . . ."); see also Frances Elisabeth Olsen,
Feminism in Central and Eastern Europe: Risks and Possibilities of American Engagement,
106 YALE L.J. 2215, 2232 (1997) (discussing women's return to more domestic
roles following unprecedented involvement in industry during World War II).
47. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 43, at 1597 (describing "ideal
worker" as person without primary childcare responsibilities and often working
overtime at short notice).
1999]
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fessional jobs for the middle class and above.4 8 When work is structured
in this way, caregivers typically cannot attain these jobs because they can-
not perform as ideal workers. Their inability to do so gives rise to domes-
ticity's second defining characteristic-its system of providing for
children's care by marginalizing their caregivers, thereby cutting them off
from the social roles that offer authority and responsibility. 49
Domesticity also introduced a new description of men and women.
The ideology of domesticity held that men belong in the market because
they are competitive and aggressive; 50 women belong in the home because
of their focus on relationships, children and an ethic of care. 5 ' In its origi-
nal context, domesticity's descriptions of men and women served tojustify
and reproduce the breadwinner and housewife roles by establishing
norms that identified successful gender performance with character traits
suitable for those roles.52
Both the ideology and the practice of domesticity retain their hold. A
1998 survey found that two-thirds of Americans believe it would be best for
women to stay home and care for their family and children. 53 Domestic-
ity's ideals persist in vernacular gender talk such as John Gray's Men Are
From Mars, Women Are From Venus.5 4 Even some strains of feminist theory
48. See id. (stating that to be successful lawyer or other corporate employee,
women must often be childless to meet standard of "ideal worker").
49. See id. at 1608-38 (discussing how marginalization of caregivers from posi-
tions of authority leads to disempowerment in work environment and at home).
Domesticity ascribes to women characteristics such as nurturing, selflessness, emo-
tionality, patience and asexuality which make them better suited for the routine
daily tasks of home maintenance and childcare. See Ehrenreich, supra note 45, at
509 (discussing current influence of "cult of domesticity"). Due to the devaluation
of the domestic realm, however, "these traits are seen as good for women to pos-
sess but not as valuable or important in and of themselves." Id. Moreover, these
feminine ideals of domesticity result in women rarely being accorded moral au-
thority and social respect. See id.; see also Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So
Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit'": A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 374, 388 (1993) (explaining "separate spheres" ideology that con-
fined women to distinct world focused on children, husbands, family dependents
and church).
50. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 17 (1982) (describing how
"masculine" traits are associated with success in workplace); Ehrenreich, supra note
45, at 510-11 (stating that men are characterized as being selfish, authoritative and
aggressive and, therefore, as well-suited to marketplace).
51. See GILLIGAN, supra note 50, at 17 (describing woman as nurturer, care-
taker and helpmate); Ehrenreich, supra note 45, at 509 (discussing characteristics
typically attributed to women according to ideology of domesticity).
52. See Ehrenreich, supra note 45, at 510 (distinguishing between "good" char-
acteristics for women and those for men).
53. See Richard Morin & Megan Rosenfeld, With More Equity, More Sweat; Poll
Shows Sexes Agree on Pros and Cons of New Roles, WASH. PosT, Mar. 22, 1998, at A17
(discussing finding that majority of Americans believe that it is better for mothers
to stay home and take care of house and children).
54. JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS 2 (1994) (dis-
cussing how men and women communicate and view world differently). Gray
[Vol. 44: p. 305
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tend to perpetuate this domestic vision by associating women with an ethic
of care.
55
If we ask not whether women are in the workforce, but whether they
have achieved equality there, we find that most have not. High levels of
workforce participation gloss over the fact that, even today, roughly forty
percent of mothers of childbearing age do not work full time full year in
an economy where part-time workers typically received low pay and little
advancement. 56 In addition, one-fourth of mothers. of childbearing age
are homemakers.
57
The implications of these data are rarely noted. Nearly two-thirds of
mothers of childbearing age are not "ideal" workers even in the minimal
sense of working full time all year.58 Single as well as married mothers are
affected: never married mothers are the group of women most likely to be
at home. 59 If most mothers are excluded by our work ideals (now defined
by the life patterns of men), it is time to change.those ideals.
In addition, the mommy track debate has shown us that full-time work
is no guarantee of avoiding economic vulnerability. 60 Full-time workers
who cannot work overtime often suffer adverse job consequences as a re-
compares men to Mars, the Roman god of war, and women to Venus, the Roman
goddess of love and beauty. See id.
55. See, e.g., GILLIGAN, supra note 50, at 157-60 (stating that some feminist the-
orists have claimed ethic of care as part of feminism); Toni Lester, Efficient But Not
Equitable: The Problem with Using the Law and Economics Paradigm to Interpret Sexual
Harassment in the Work Place, 22 VT. L. REv. 519, 549 (1998) (recognizing division
between feminists who associate women with ethic of care and those who do not).
56. The statistics on page 2, except where another source is indicated, are
based on the computations of Professor Manuelita Ureta, based on machine-reada-
ble versions of Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, Current Popula-
tion Survey, March Supplement, Public Use Files (1996). Washington: Bureau of
the Census [producer and distributor], 1962-1997. Santa Monica, CA: Unicon
Research Corporation [producer and distributor of CPS Utilities], 1997 [hereinaf-
ter Census Data]. Data are for mothers between 25 and 45 years of age, who have
children under eighteen. Full time full year is defined as working forty hours or
more per week, forty-nine or more weeks per year. This definition reflects my
sense that employers generally consider full-time to mean at least a forty-hour
workweek. Grateful thanks to Professor Ureta for her help.
57. Id. (40% do not work full time full year); Anne L. Kallenberg, Part-Time
Work and Workers in the United States: Correlates and Policy Issues, 52 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 771, 775 (1996) (low pay and little advancement).
58. Census Data, supra note 56.
59. See CHIS TILLY, HALF A JOB: BAD AND GOOD PART-TIME JOBS IN A CHANG-
ING LABOR MARKET 16 tbl.2.1 (1996) (discussing role of part-time married work-
ers); Jane Waldfogel, The Effect of Children on Women's Wages, 62 AM. Soc. REv. 209,
211 (1997) (explaining that never-married mothers are most likely to stay at
home).
60. See RUTH SIDEL, ON HER OWN 170-79 (1990) (documenting glass ceiling in
medicine, law, management and politics); Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 43, at
1601 (arguing that women are disempowered in elite working environments).
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suit-the best jobs today typically require overtime work.61 An extraordi-
narily important fact is that jobs requiring extensive overtime exclude virtually all
mothers of childbearing age (ninety-three percent) .62
Our economy is divided into mothers and others. Having children
has a very strong negative effect on women's income, an effect that actu-
ally increased in the 1980s. 63 Women who work full-time earn only sixty
cents for every dollar earned by men. 64 Single mothers are most severely
affected, earning one-third the wages of two-earner families and one-half
those of two-parent families where the wife is not employed. 65
Moreover, although the wage gap between men and women has
fallen, the gap between the wages of mothers and others has widened.66
As a result, in an age when women's wages are catching up with men's,
mothers lag behind.67 Given that eighty-seven percent of women become
mothers during their work lives, this pattern is inconsistent with gender
equality.68
61. See Allen M. Parkman, Bringing Consistency to the Financial Arrangements of
Divorce, 87 Ky. L.J. 51, 86 (1999) (stating that mothers are put at disadvantage
because "[h]igher paying jobs often require unexpected overtime and travel").
62. See Census Data, supra note 56 (noting that 93% of mothers of childbear-
ing age work less than 49 hours per week); JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED
AMERICANS: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE 5 (1991) (explaining rise in
amount of time spent working); Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 43, at 1598-99
(discussing women's inability to work overtime because of caregiving
responsibilities).
63. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 43, at 1602-04 (providing insight into
growing economic disparity).
64. See Mariana Moore, Proposition 165: We Won the Battle, But Are We Losing the
War?, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 6, 10 (1993) (noting that women earn 60 cents on
the dollar compared to men). More recent reports show that the wage gap be-
tween men and women is narrowing. See Wage Gap Between the Sexes Is Narrowing,
N.Y. TIMES,June 10, 1998, at A20 (stating that wage gap between sexes narrowed by
three cents since last spring). Note, however, that the standard wage gap calcula-
tion compares full-time male workers to full-time female workers. Consequently it
misses most of the marginalization mothers experience, because it does not take
into account either part-time workers or women staying home with children. Of
course, wage gap data is very useful for other purposes, notably for comparing
ideal-worker men with ideal-worker women.
65. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 43, at 1604 n.257 (comparing income
of single mothers and two-parent families). In fact, "female headed families ...
are three times more likely than other families to have incomes below the poverty
line." Id. at 1604; see also Spenser Rich, Children Feel Financial Pinch When Families
Split, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1991, at A21 (stating that mothers and children suffer
economically when parents divorce).
66. SeeJane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from
Welfare "Reform, "Family and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 723 (1998) (not-
ing that wage gap between men and women has improved, but that mothers re-
main disadvantaged).
67. See id.
68. See Waldfogel, supra note 59, at 209 (finding that nearly ninety percent of
working women become mothers in course of their working lives); see generally Jane
Waldfogel, The Family Gap for Young Women in the U.S. and Britain, 16J. LAB. ECON.
505 (1998) (discussing disparity in ages).
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The gender arrangements that form the core of domesticity remain
unbending. Like Mrs. Krupnik, women still shoulder virtually all the fam-
ily work traditionally performed by housewives. 69 Unlike Mrs. Krupnik, in
real life, they pay a steep price for doing so. 70 Meanwhile, men still spe-
cialize in market work, which continues to be framed around the ideal
worker with access to a flow of family work.7 1
Domesticity did not die-it mutated. 72 In the nineteenth century
most married women were housewives. 73 Most remain economically
marginalized today.74 This is not equality.
IV. DECONSTRUCTING DOMESTICITY
One of the social and cultural norms that sustain and reproduce do-
mesticity is the social convention of denying its existence. The fact that it
is denied in children's books should not concern us, for many hard facts
of life are glossed over in the interests of reassuring the young. What is
69. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 43, at 1599 ("[W]ives who work
outside of the home still do the majority of work inside it."). Studies have found
that working wives do 79.9% of housework, up to five times the domestic work that
their husbands do, and an average of 144% of the total work of a traditional home-
maker. See id. (reciting figures of several studies comparing time worked by work-
ing wives, working husbands and non-working wives).
70. See id. (stating that working mothers reported "a lot" or "extreme" stress
because of their dual responsibilities).
71. See id. (explaining that domestic work done by women allows married
men to conform to "workaholic norms"); see also Rebecca Korzec, Working on the
"Mommy-Track": Motherhood and Women Lawyers, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 117, 126
(1997) (same).
72. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning
Wives' Household Labor, 1850-80, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1189-91 (1994) (developing
notion that gender patterns tend to mutate rather than disappear) [hereinafter
Siegel, Home as Work]; see also Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law:
Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2210 (1994)
(stating that domesticity was able to survive because of its malleability, adaptability
and ability to disguise itself) [hereinafter Siegel, Modernization]. This article builds
upon the work of many prior legal scholars in addition to Siegel. See, e.g., DEBORAH
RHODE,JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAw 305-06 (1989) (dis-
cussing advancements in feminist movement and new discriminatory hurdles
movement faces) [hereinafter RHODE, JUSTICE]; Nancy Dowd, Work and Family: Re-
structuring the Workplace, 32 ARIz. L. REv. 431 (1990) (proposing mechanism to
restructure workplace by degendering work and family roles); Mary Joe Frug, A
Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1045 (1992) (discussing labor
market hostility to working mothers); Deborah Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles,
63 FoRDHAm L. REv. 39 (1994) (revealing women's role in marketplace) [hereinaf-
ter Rhode, Gender]; Deborah Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges
and Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731 (1991) (same) [hereinafter, Rhode, Prob-
lem]; Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1 (1996) (same).
73. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 43, at 1568 (stating that nineteenth-
century women knew that their sphere was at home and were barred from male
marketplace sphere).
74. For a discussion of economic marginalization, see supra notes 56-68 and
accompanying text.
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distressing is that we, as a society, often gloss over the persistence of ine-
quality with reassurances that "most women now work."75
Women have always worked.7 6 The point is that their hard work fre-
quently does not translate into economic entitlements. We live in a world
in which men hold most of the "good jobs," while women are disadvan-
taged by the ideal-worker norm in two ways. 77 As I discussed in an earlier
article, women are disadvantaged when courts treat the ideal worker's
wage as his sole personal property upon divorce. 78 This is inappropriate
because that wage reflects the joint work both of the ideal worker and of
the caregiver whose family work allows him to perform as an ideal
worker.79 Absent coverture, an asset produced by two parties should not
be treated as the property of only one of them.8 0 Ending this practice
would go a long way towards eliminating the impoverishment of divorced
women and their children.
Moreover, women are disadvantaged not only by the ideal-worker
norm in family entitlements, but also by the ideal-worker norm in market
work.8 1 For the remainder of this talk, I will discuss how that norm struc-
tures market work and how to eliminate it.
The accepted understanding is that mothers often drop off the career
track for personal reasons and that these reasons reflect their own choice.
Not only do conservatives such as Richard Posner endorse this view, 82 but
women often use "choice" language themselves.8 3 Said a letter to the Yale
Alumni Magazine in 1992:
75. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 43, at 1600 (arguing that working
mother statistics do not accurately represent percentage working part-time or at
home).
76. See Silbaugh, supra note 72, at 10-13 (classifying traditional household
tasks as work).
77. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 43, at 1597 (criticizing gender system
of "ideal-worker father and marginalized woman").
78. See Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82
GEO. L.J. 2227, 2252 (1994) (discussing courts' application of "he who earns it,
owns it" rule that gives ownership of what should be family wage to husband).
79. See id. at 2290 (concluding that family property is produced by simultane-
ous effort of husband and wife). "Without a flow of domestic services from the
wife, the husband could not meet the ideal of a worker with geographical mobility,
no daytime childcare responsibilities, and few other domestic responsibilities." Id.
80. See id. at 2229 n.5 (defining coverture as system that allocates all property
rights in couple's assets to husband). "Property producedjointly should be owned
in common, not allocated one-sidedly to the husband:" Id. at 2290.
81. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 43, at 1597-1603 (discussing extreme
challenge women must face in trying to be both "ideal worker" and home-maker).
82. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 157 (5th ed. 1998)
(stating that women "decide" to become housewives); see also Robin West, Submis-
sion, Choice and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1449, 1455-56
(1986) (rebuking Posner's notions).
83. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 43, at 1596-98 (stating that women
often feel they choose between childbearing and career); see also SusAN M. OKIN,
JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 142-46 (1989) (discussing how marginalization of
caregivers affects women's "choice" in favor of domesticity).
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I left a Yale doctoral program in 1988, disillusioned with aca-
demic life. Since then . . .I have found my ambitions for a ca-
reer-any career-gradually being submerged by the desire to
raise my children at home. I do work part-time, as a freelance
copy editor. But working in sweat clothes at the dining room
table, surrounded by toys and unfinished housework, is not ex-
actly a fulfilling professional experience. Yet despite occasionally
longings for the world of 'real' work, I am sure that I have made
the right choice-for me.84
Feminists need to provide a clear response to the problems engendered by
viewing mothers' exodus from market work in terms of "choice."
An analysis of domesticity as a gender system allows us to see that
women's "choices" take place in a context that requires ideal workers to
command the social power available to men-to relocate their families
and to enjoy a flow of family work that most fathers (but few mothers)
enjoy.85 A system that requires workers to command the social power of
men in order to get "good jobs" discriminates against women. It is incon-
sistent with our ideals of gender equality.86
The argument may best be understood by beginning with the situa-
tion in which equipment is designed around men's bodies. Equipment
used in traditionally male jobs is typically designed to specifications that fit
most men but few women.8 7 The most famous example is the cockpit case
in which a court found that cockpits excluded 93 percent of women but
only 25.8 percent of men.88 If cockpits are designed around men's bod-
84. Letter from Ruth Wilsea Adkins to the Editor, Yale Alumni Magazine, at 4-5
(Feb. 1992).
85. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 43, at 1603 (stating that most wives of
high-income husbands "choose" not to work, reinforcing ability of men to conform
to ideal-worker standard); see also Margaret M. Paloma, Reconsidering the Dual-Career
Marriage: A Longitudinal Approach, in Two PAYCHECKS: LIFE IN DUAL-EARNER FAMi-
LIES 713 (Joan Aldais ed., 1982) (stating that married professional mothers tend to
slow or sacrifice career development whereas fathers do not).
86. For a discussion of anti-discrimination laws, see infra notes 92 to 164 and
accompanying text.
87. See Ellen Shapiro, Remedies for Sex-Discriminatory Health and Safety Conditions
in Male-Dominated Industrial Jobs, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1087, 1088 (1980)
(describing equipment in heavy industry as suited for male workers rather than
average worker).
88. See Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, 568 F.2d 50, 52 n.1 (8th Cir. 1977) (quoting
statistics that defendant's pilot height requirement excluded 25.8% of men and
93% of women); see also Shapiro, supra note 87, at 1089-92 (detailing relationship
between productivity and design of equipment). Professor Shapiro addresses the
required interaction between people and machinery and argues that "optimum
production results when mechanical devices function . . .in ways which do not
oppose the physiological integrity of their operators." Id. at 1089. Efficient work-
place design becomes most important for women who are in male-dominated man-
ufacturing jobs, as improved ergonomics may increase their ease in operating
machines and ultimately enhance job performance. See id. at 1091 (revealing po-
tential obstacles to women in manufacturing positions).
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ies, it should not surprise us that more men than women have jobs as
pilots.8 9 Giving women "equal" opportunity to live up to standards
designed around men does not offer women true equality. Rather, it is a
way of perpetuating discrimination against women and calling it equality.
The same conclusion holds true when society designs workplaces
around the ideal of an employee who works without career interruptions
and takes no time off for childbearing or childrearing. This way of design-
ing the ideal worker enshrines men's bodies - for men need take no time
off for childbearing - and their life patterns, in a society where men do
only twenty percent of the child care.
9 0
Designing workplaces around men's bodies and life patterns discrimi-
nates against women. In demanding the elimination of masculine norms,
women are asking not for special treatment but for simple equality: a
world designed around the average person rather than the average man.
9 1
Is the discrimination mothers experience actionable under existing
federal and state anti-discrimination statutes? Answering this question is a
large project, beyond the scope of this short article. Yet here I take an
important first step: to conceptualize potential test cases where mothers
stand the best chance of winning.
Note that the issue is not whether mothers should sue; mothers al-
ready are suing. A recent preliminary review of federal cases turned up
more than fifty cases where mothers sued claiming discrimination.9 2 We
can expect increasing numbers of mothers' lawsuits because of a genera-
tional shift. Generation X has different attitudes towards paid work than
have previous generations. In the past, workers may well have been willing
to do whatever the employer required because of informal guarantees of
permanent employment. Younger workers who saw their fathers, or their
friends' fathers, fired after they had "given their all" to the company, are
often less willing to follow in the tracks of prior generations. Karen Mc-
Guire, manager of staffing and development for Northwestern University,
explains, "They're looking for quality of life issues. They're fitting work
into their entire life. Work is just a part of their life, as opposed to the
baby boomers, where work was their life. They're still career-minded. The
89. See Boyd, 568 F.2d at 54 (discussing number of female applicants who
failed to meet height specifications designed to ensure safety within cockpit); see
also Shapiro, supra note 87, at 1091 (illustrating potential problems for women who
attempt to work with equipment designed for men). In addition to being kept out
of certain professions due to ill-fitting equipment, many women suffer from in-
creased physical stress and muscular strain (documented by employee injury and
disability records). See id. ("The disproportionate incidence of chronic musculo-
skeletal impairments suffered by women in traditionally all-male workplaces may
be documented by a variety of records.").
90. See ROBINSON & GODBEY, supra note 28, at 105 tbl. 3.
91. Cf MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 87 (1990) (discussing
masculine norms in context of market work and family work).
92. These cases will be discussed in a forthcoming article entitled Litigating
Motherhood.
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difference is that they also focus on relationships and family. They're dif-
ferent from the yuppies who came before."9 3 A second contributing to
the generational shift in attitudes towards paid work is that, whereas my
generation of women was simply amazed that we were allowed to compete
with men on any terms, many younger women feel entitled or compelled
to work full-time. This new sense of entitlement to work (for privileged
women) or compulsion to do so (for less privileged ones) feeds younger
women's sense that they should not have to give up their traditions of
motherhood as a condition of paid employment.
Suits litigating motherhood are here to stay: the only choice for femi-
nist lawyers is whether we will continue to allow them to proceed with no
attempt to shape the course of this litigation. This would be a mistake,
because if we leave the litigation to chance, we will continue to see what
the cases now show: unsympathetic plaintiffs, flawed legal analysis, and
suits hobbled by the lack of the necessary statistics documenting the con-
tinuing marginalization of mothers. Take for example the suit where a
woman whose job included fund raising neglected to send eighty-three
acknowledgment letters to donors and then claimed discrimination on
grounds of motherhood.9 4 Or the case where the plaintiff had taken ad-
vantage of a close personal relationship with her employer: after being
granted a four-day work week and getting paid for work her colleagues did
while she was at home, she then demanded a three-day workweek and a
raise.9 5 Other cases involved analytical flaws, notably where mothers sued
under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act for issues that clearly involved
childrearing rather than childbearing courts are correct in concluding that
such cases do not involve pregnancy.9 6 An additional litigation problem is
the paucity of recent statistics documenting mothers' marginalization: this
hurt the plaintiff in a case where the court faulted her for relying on "de-
cades old studies" on the percentage of women who work part-time.9 7
93. Meredith Gordon, Northwestern U: Job Hopping, Family Focus Characterize
Gen Xers, 2/10/99 U-WIRE (No Page), 1999 WL 12724825. See also Bernard J.
Wolfson, Workplace Ethic Defined by Age Generation Gap Demands More Flexibility, 8/
15/99 ARIZ. REPUBLIC D6, 1999 WL 4192847 ("companies can't afford to lose em-
ployees because of rigid work environments that alienate any one age group");
Maggie Jackson, Generation X Makes Mark in the Workplace, 2/19/99 PATRIOT LEDGER
(Quincy Mass.) 23, 1999 WL 8451995 ("His generation is also comfortable drawing
the line at too much work. They are driving companies to allow employees to
make use of work-life programs that were little promoted or honestly supported.");
Roger Trapp, Smells Like Team Spirit, 3/5/98 THE INDEPENDENT (London) F2, F3,
1998 WL 13639801 ("they 'like money, but they also say they want balance in their
lives.'")
94. See Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc, 116 F.3d 340, 340 (8th Cir. 1997).
95. See Spina v. Management Recruiters of O'Hare, 764 F. Supp. 519 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
96. See, e.g., Record v. Mill Neck Manor Lutheran Sch. For The Deaf, 611 F.
Supp. 905 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
97. See Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1997).
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Mothers have sued, and will continue to sue.9 8 The only question is
whether the issue of marginalized motherhood will be litigated in an un-
systematic way, with idiosyncratic and often unsympathetic plaintiffs, poor
statistics, and flawed analysis. This should not be allowed to happen.
What is needed is a concerted effort to carefully choose and litigate the
test cases most likely to win, on the model of Ruth Bader Ginsberg's early
work at the ACLU Women's Rights Project.
This Article begins that effort. Though I focus on federal statutes,
this does not mean that I discount the possibilities for litigation based on
state law. Yet we have to start somewhere, and I have chosen to start by
analyzing the potential for lawsuits under the Equal Pay Act 99 and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act.100
V. EQUAL PAY ACT SUITS
The EPA requires a plaintiff to prove first that she is receiving less
compensation than male workers for substantially equal work in the same
establishment.1 0 1 A key challenge for part-time workers in EPA suits is to
prove that they are doing "substantially equal" work.10 2 This requirement
means that a plaintiff cannot win an EPA suit in a situation where part-
98. Some of the plaintiffs have met with some success, although the litigation
is still at the motion stage. See, e.g., Trezza v. The Hartford, Inc., 1998 WL 912101
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that plaintiff stated cause of action where she claims em-
ployer treated women with children differently from men with children); Roberts
v. United States Postmaster General, 947 F. Supp. 282, 289 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (find-
ing policy that prohibits use of sick leave to attend to family members may consti-
tute disparate impact claim).
99. For a discussion of EPA suits involving depressed wages for part-time
workers, see infra notes 92-120 and accompanying text, Martha Chamallas, Women
and Part-Time Work: The Case for Pay Equity and Equal Access, 64 N.C. L. REV. 709,
715-22 (1986) (outlining explanations for pay disparity between full- and part-time
workers). Studies have shown that pro rata, part-time workers earn less than their
full-time counterparts. See Chamallas, supra, at 715 (revealing part-time workers
only earned twenty-eight percent of wages earned by full-time employees even
though part-time employees worked forty-six percent of hours worked by full-time
employees).
100. For a discussion of the law suits I envision under Title VII, see infra notes
130-67 and accompanying text.
101. The Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988) The EPA mandates
that: "No employer.., shall discriminate ... between employees on the basis of
sex by paying wages to employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex." Id. The EPA provides three specific and
one broad exception to its prohibition against discrimination: a seniority system, a
merit system, a system based upon quality or quantity of production or any system
based on "a factor other than sex." SeeJack A. Friedman, Real-Gender Neutrality for
the Factor-Other-Than-Sex Defense, N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 241, 272 (1994) (discuss-
ing exceptions in more detail).
102. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (stating
that plaintiff must prove employer pays different wage scales for equal work);
Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 1973) (same); see
also Chamallas, supra note 99, at 738 (stating that part-time worker must establish
that employment is substantially equal to establish prima facie case).
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time status is used as a reason not to offer plum assignments, or where a
part-time worker is otherwise not doing work substantially equal to that of
full-time employees.1 03 A suitable test case might involve a law firm where
a female attorney is in a highly specialized, technical field that does not
ordinarily require travel. For example, a Washington, D.C. lawyer involved
in agency litigation, trusts and estates or a specialized tax practice might
be a good candidate to bring such a suit. Further, a promising plaintiff
would be an employee with excellent evaluations who had worked full-
time for a significant period and then switched to part-time, who contin-
ued to get excellent evaluations but who ultimately found herself making
less per hour than full-time attorneys doing similar work.
A key issue for such a plaintiff's success will be whether she can dis-
lodge judges' sense that only people who meet the masculine ideal-worker
norm are really "serious" and "committed" workers. 10 4 This is precisely
the kind of discriminatory norm that equality theory should begin to
target.
The second issue is whether the part-time employee's work requires
the same level of effort.10 5 The challenge for an EPA plaintiff will be to
convince the courts to define effort as effort per hour. This should not be
too difficult-there already exists management literature stressing the
need to redefine productivity in terms of output rather than in terms of
face time. 10 6 Surely the notion that employers should be required to mea-
sure productivity in terms of output cannot be seen as a radical claim.
10 7
In some cases, a track record may also exist that will be helpful in
proving that the full- and part-time jobs at issue are in fact substantially
similar. For example, at a large bank in California, permanent bank tell-
103. See Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1049 (5th Cir. 1973)
(stating that "the controlling factor under the Equal Pay Act is job content" as
determined by actual duties that respective employees are called upon to per-
form); see also Carole Supowitz Katz, Wage Discrimination Claims: Employee's Prior
Salary Fails the "Factor Other Than Sex" Test, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 207, 221
(1984) (stating ways employers could pay less to part-time employee without violat-
ing EPA). Factors that provide a legitimate basis for compensating employees dif-
ferently include: seniority, shift differential, differences in number of hours
worked each week and whether the work is temporary or part-time. See id. at 221
(outlining potential obstacles for part-time employees challenging employers for
unequal treatment and wages).
104. See Peter Goselin & Gileen Silverstein, Intentionally Impermanent Employ-
ment and the Paradox of Productivity, 26 STETSON L. REV. 1, 18 (1996) (discussing
perception that part-time workers are not as productive as full-time workers). The
authors note that "there is simply no incentive for most contingent employees...
to participate in improving productivity." Id.
105. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1994) (requiring showing that compared jobs
meet equal effort requirement); see also Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d
259, 265 (3d Cir. 1969) (discussing requirements under EPA).
106. See 6/22/89 NAT'L PROD. REv. 261 (noting that measuring productivity
by number of hours worked is ineffective).
107. See id.; see also Katz, supra note 103, at 220 (suggestingjob performance as
optimal method of evaluating work).
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ers were laid off and then rehired as part-time workers. 10 8 During the
UPS strike in 1997, employees made a number of statements to the effect
that part- and full-time workers did the same work.10 9 This type of data
would be useful in showing the existence of wage disparities between two
workers, male and female, in jobs that require equal "skill, effort, and
responsibility."11 0
Another important issue is whether this type of case can be distin-
guished from comparable worth cases, in which a plaintiff argues that an
employer is required by anti-discrimination law to pay workers in predomi-
nantly female jobs the same wage as employees are paid in predominantly
male jobs that are rated by the employer as requiring equal levels of skill,
effort, risk, responsibility, etc.11 1 Comparable worth cases appear to make
courts nervous because they involve comparing people in very different
jobs-for example, a nurse and an electrician. 112 Although the logic of
108. See The Wells Fargo-First Interstate Merger, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1996, at D1
(discussing bank teller layoffs in California).
109. See Ann Bookman, Flexibility at What Price? The Costs of Part-Time Work for
Women Workers, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 799, 804-05 (1995) (observing that these
"new" part-time employees were mostly women and received no health care bene-
fits, pensions, vacation or sick leave); Labor Still Loses the War, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 7,
1998, at A19 (discussing UPS strike). These "new" part-time employees were
mostly women and received no health care benefits, pensions, vacation or sick
leave. See Judith Evans, Teamsters, UPS Agree to Resume Talks at Federal Mediator's
Behest, WASH. PosT, Aug. 7, 1997, at E7 ("I'm a part-timer, but work 50 to 60 hours
a week, receive part-time pay,.while the person standing next to me does the same
job and earns more.").
110. See Bookman, supra note 109, at 805.
111. SeeJeanne M. Dennis, The Lessons of Comparable Worth: A Feminist Vision of
Law and Economic Theory, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 22-23 (1993) (defining develop-
ment of comparable worth theory). The article suggests that the passage of the
EPA in 1963 and the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 caused
feminists to focus on wage discrimination in segregated labor markets. See id. (dis-
cussing placement of women in lower-paying "female" occupations). Comparable
worth programs, designed to educate the public, showed that certain occupations
are undervalued because they are performed mainly by women. See id. (discussing
problem of "pink-collar" ghetto). Comparable worth attempts to "realign wo-
men's wages with those of men" and stress the importance of pay equity for wo-
men's jobs that require similar skills and responsibilities as higher-paid male
occupations. See id.
112. See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n v. State of Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir.
1986) (comparing higher rated, lower paid nurses and lower rated higher paid
electricians); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1977) (comparing
clerical workers and physical plant workers such as carpenters, plumbers and elec-
tricians). Comparable worth cases require courts to apply a "substantially equal"
test to jobs that require the performance of different tasks. See Paul Weiler, The
Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HAv. L. REv. 1728, 1733
(1986) (discussing how "substantially equal" test forces courts to use discretion
when comparing different jobs and wages). For the critics of comparable worth, it
is worth noting that the European Union and Canada have had success with the
implementation. See M. Neil Browne et al., Comparable Worth in Ontario: Lessons the
United States Can Learn, 17 I-ARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 130-31 (1994) (suggesting that
greater government guidance was key to Ontario's success, yet acknowledging
United States's greater reluctance to accept intervention into market); Christo-
[Vol. 44: p. 305
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss3/2
MARKET WORK & FAMILY WORK
comparable worth cases is clear-presumably an employer would not give
equal rankings to jobs that were not equal-many courts felt that such
cases were asking them to dictate wages instead of allowing the market to
do so. 113 What EPA masculine-norm cases ask is less ambitious. Instead of
requiring courts to mandate equal pay to a nurse and an electrician, they
would only require courts to mandate equal pay for two trust and estates
lawyers in the same firm doing the same highly specialized work, or two
UPS workers in a context where no substantial difference exists between
the work performed by part- and full-time workers doing the same job.' 14
This prospect may prove less unsettling.
If a plaintiff can successfully prove that the full- and part-time jobs at
issue are substantially similar, the burden shifts to the defendant.1 1 5 Be-
cause the EPA prohibits only pay differentials based on sex discrimination,
an employer can defend by proving that the wage differential is due to a
"factor other than sex."' 16 Thus, the question becomes: "Is a part-time
schedule a factor other than sex?"
pher McCrudden, Comparable Worth: A Common Dilemma, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 396,
436 (1986) (stating that European subsidiaries of American companies have been
subjected to legal requirement of equal pay and have survived).
113. See Bush v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 706 (9th Cir. 1984)
(stating that courts cannot engage in sweeping revisions of market rates); Christen-
sen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that Title VII was not
intended to abrogate law of supply and demand); see also Dennis, supra note 102, at
23 (quoting Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1330 (1989)). One commentator stated:
[A] competitive labor market will achieve comparable worth; for that is
the equilibrium condition of such a market. If a particular job classifica-
tion happens to be overpaid relative to skill, responsibility and other con-
siderations that determine the value and cost of workers' time, workers
will flow into the classification, reducing the wage until the excess de-
mand is eliminated. And if the job classification happens to be un-
derpaid, workers will leave for better jobs, causing the wage to rise.
Id. (quoting Posner).
In response to such criticism to comparable worth, other economists have
stated:
In the future, after sex . . . discrimination [has] been eliminated, the
pattern of occupational wages will be determined in a market that is more
free and competitive. The wage structure that then results from the inter-
play of supply and demand will surely look very different from the ex-
isting one, because the supply of and demand for labor in each
occupation will no longer be affected by discrimination as they now are.
Barbara Bergmann, The Economic Case for Comparable Worth, in COMPARABLE WORTH:
NEW DIRECrIONS FOR RESEARCH 71, 72 (Heidi Hartmann ed., 1985).
114. See Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1049 (5th Cir. 1973)
(stating that "the controlling factor under the Equal Pay Act is job content").
115. See Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1526 (11th
Cir. 1992) (stating that plaintiff suing under EPA must meet fairly strict standard
of proving that she performed substantially similar work for less pay, and burden
then falls to employer to establish one of four affirmative defenses provided in
Act).
116. See Friedman, supra note 101, at 242-43 (outlining Circuit courts' stan-
dards for "factor other than sex" defense). The Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Cir-
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Although case law exists in both directions, it should be clear that the
EPA's protection is broader than the situation where an employer has
lower-paying jobs explicitly set aside for women and higher-paying jobs
explicitly set aside for men. It seems highly unlikely that any employer in
the United States today would be foolish enough to openly discriminate in
this way. Rather, sex discrimination today is more likely to be based on a
gendered sense of who is a "good candidate." If the EPA does not apply
whenever the employer disguises a discriminatory job description in gen-
der-neutral language, an employer can easily evade the EPA by differenti-
ating jobs on the basis of a factor that correlates highly with sex but does
not refer to body shape. 117 It makes no sense to assume that Congress
intended to make the EPA so easy to evade." 18
cuits require a wage classification system to be "gender neutral" and "equally
applied." See id. at 242 n.8 (citing Brewster v. Barnes, 788 F.2d 985, 992 (4th Cir.
1986)) (holding that state compensation board's failure to pay female correctional
officer same salary as male counterparts was not based on bona fide use of factors
other than sex); see also Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989) (stat-
ing that "an employer cannot use a gender-neutral factor to avoid liability unless
the factor is used and applied in good faith"); Strecker v. Grand Forks Soc. Sec.
Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 103 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding state personnel classification system
was valid factor other than sex), overruled by Robino v. Norton, 682 F.2d 192 (8th
Cir. 1982).
The Second and Eleventh Circuits have taken a different approach by using a
standard that is less deferential to the employer. These courts allow the exception
only for wage systems that are related to the performance of the complaining em-
ployee's specific job duties. See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520,
525 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 440 (1992); Glenn v. General Motors
Corp. 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).
The Third, Sixth and Ninth Circuits use an intermediate standard that re-
quires an employer to specify a legitimate reason for its wage classification system.
See EEOC v.J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988); Kouba v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982); Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc.,
473 F.2d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973) (stating that
"economic benefits to an employer can justify a wage differential"); see also Katz,
supra note 103, at 210-11 (discussing potential for employers to use "factor other
than sex" exception to circumvent purposes of EPA due to exception's open-
ended language).
117. See Deborah J. Vagins, Note, Occupational Segregation and the Male-Worker-
Norm: Challenging Objective Work Requirements Under Title VII, 18 WOMEN'S RTs. L.
REP. 79, 83 (1996) (noting that supposedly "neutral" qualifications still dispropor-
tionately affect women; originally student paper written at suggestion of author).
"Objective" work requirements tend to be adapted to the workstyles and lifestyles
of non-caretakers and therefore adversely impact women. See id. ("Facially neutral
job requirements often reflect the family roles and work schedules that men tradi-
tionally have adopted."). Most professional jobs are still based on a male-worker
norm, which keeps women from competing for these jobs because they can not
meet these "male" norms. See id. (stressing continued male bias in job require-
ments and notions of "good" job candidates).
118. See Katz, supra note 103, at 210-11 (discussing Congressional intent for
passage of EPA). The article notes that the Senate and House Reports and Sub-
committee Hearings, the floor debates in Congress and President John F. Ken-
nedy's message when signing the act into law all "express the broad anti-
discriminatory purposes of the EPA." See id. at n.22-25 (citing S. REP. No. 176, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963); H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1963);
324
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In Coming Glass Works v. Brennan,1 19 the United States Supreme Court
held that employers could not pay a wage differential for night-shift work
because the different schedule was not a "factor other than sex." 1 20 Be-
cause the difference between night work and day work seems more signifi-
cant than the difference between a part-time and a full-time worker,
Coming Glass provides support for the view that part-time work is not a
"factor other than sex."1 2 1 This interpretation is reinforced by the Coming
Glass Court's restriction of the EPA's "factor other than sex" language to
working conditions, which it then narrowly defined as "surroundings"
(such as toxic chemicals or other, more conventional, "work hazards"). 122
In addition, although an old bulletin issued by the agency in charge of
implementing the EPA defined part-time work as a factor other than sex,
the new rules do not take a position on the matter.
123
Hearings on S. 882 and S. 910 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1963) (statement of W. Willard
Wirtz, Sec. of Labor); Hearings on HR. 3861 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of
the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 16-33 (1963); 109
CONG. REc. 9212 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Donahue); XXI CONG. Q. 978 (June 14,
1963)).
Despite Congress' intent to target discrimination, it did not want to eliminate
employer flexibility in formulating job classification systems. See Katz, supra, at 211
(discussing Congress's intent in providing for exceptions to wage discrimination
prohibition).
119. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
120. See id. at 204-05 (outlining Court's reasons for affirming lower court's
holding). The Coming Court held:
The differential in base wages originated at a time when no other night
employees received higher pay than corresponding day workers .... The
differential arose simply because men would not work at the low rates
paid women inspectors, and it reflected a job market in which Corning
could pay women less than men for the same work.
Id.
121. See Friedman, supra note 101, at 242 (explaining conflicts in defining
other-than-sex requirement). Although the Supreme Court has not yet defined a
"proper" standard for determining whether an employer has asserted a "factor
other than sex" defense, the Court has generally required the employer to prove a
"bona fide" wage classification system that does not discriminate on the basis of
sex.
122. See Coming, 417 U.S. at 202-03 (defining "working conditions"). The
Court defined "surroundings" as measuring the elements such as "toxic chemicals
or fumes, regularly encountered by a worker, their intensity, and their frequency."
See id. "Hazards" was outlined as including the "physical hazards regularly encoun-
tered, their frequency, and the severity of injury they can cause." Id. The Court
stressed that these definitions did not include "time of day" as a means for job
differentials, evaluations, or wage differentials. Id.
123. See Chamallas, supra note 99, at 741 (contrasting author's interpretation
with general interpretation of EPA). Professor Chamallas argues:
The interpretation does not explicitly state or otherwise indicate that em-
ployers who pay part-time workers less than full-time workers are insu-
lated against liability .... Rather, the interpretation suggests that pay
disparities between part-time and full-time workers are generally toler-
ated, unless a suspicion of discrimination is created because of the sexual
composition of the two groups of employees and the lack of substantial
21
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In summary, the EPA may provide significant opportunities to chal-
lenge the practice of paying women in part-time jobs less than full-time
workers who do substantially equal work. Masculine-norm EPA suits
should be of particular interest to unions, for they could provide a potent
tool against the practice of cutting wage costs through a shift to contingent
work. 124
As a remedy for sex discrimination, however, the EPA has several no-
table limitations. First, as noted above, in many situations employers con-
sign part-time workers to more routine, less desirable work.125 Although
this practice is part of the problem, an employer can defend against an
EPA suit if it can prove that full- and part-time workers do not have equal
responsibility. 126 Second, because the EPA covers only wages, it does not
offer a way of challenging the common practice of penalizing part-time
workers in terms of benefits. 127 Nor does the EPA require an employer to
change promotion practices that currently marginalize many part-time
difference in the number of hours worked by each group. Thus, if the
two workforces are significantly integrated or... work a substantially dif-
ferent number of hours per week, the interpretation implies that a pay
disparity is not unlawful.
Id.
124. See Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25
U.S.F. L. Riv. 169, 204 (1991) ("[Ulnions wisely bring comparable worth lawsuits
based on Title VII or the Equal Pay Act to raise wages without expending bargain-
ing chips."). But see Norma M. Riccucci, Union Liability for Wage Disparities Between
Women and Men, 65 U. DET. L. REv. 379 (discussing potential for continued wage
disparities between women and men due to unions). Note, too, that these suits
would work only in contexts where the part-time track consists disproportionately
of women.
125. See Chamallas, supra note 99, at 719 (noting lower status given to part-
time workers). Typically, an employer gives the jobs that require higher levels of
skill or supervisory responsibility to full-time workers in both blue-collar and white-
collar jobs. See id. ("Employers often stereotype part-time employees as marginal
or unnecessary workers, suitable only for entry-level or inferior jobs.").
126. See Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 843 (6th Cir.
1997) (stating that plaintiff must show equal work requiring substantially similar
skill, effort and responsibilities, and that work was performed under similar work-
ing conditions); Soto v. Adams Elevator Equip. Co., 941 F.2d 543, 548 (7th Cir.
1991) (same).
127. See Coming, 417 U.S. at 199 (stating that focus of EPA is to guarantee
equal pay for equal work); see also Chamallas, supra note 99, at 716 (discussing
discrepancies between full- and part-time workers). The exclusion of part-time
workers from employment fringe benefits is an additional method that employers
use to discriminate between the two groups. See id. (outlining benefits given to
full-time employees). Studies have shown that full-time employees are more likely
to enjoy holiday benefits, employer-provided health insurance and employment-
based pension plans than part-time employees. See id. (comparing percentages of
full- and part-time employees who receive benefits).
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workers, as when part-time lawyers are taken off the promotion track. 128
To address these issues requires a suit under Title VII.
1 29
VI. TITLE VII SUITS
A. Disparate Treatment Suits to Challenge Discrimination Against Mothers
Since I came back from maternity leave, Iget the work of a paralegal . .. I
want to say, look, I had a baby, not a lobotomy. 1
30
In December of 1998, a federal district court held thatJoann Trezza
had stated a sex discrimination claim when she was passed over for a pro-
motion, despite the fact that the person who received the promotion was a
woman.13 1 Trezza, a lawyer in the legal department of The Hartford, Inc.
and the mother of two children, was passed over in late 1991 or early 1992
in favor of a woman without children. 13 2 When Trezza asked why she had
not been considered for the job, she was told that because she was a
mother, management assumed she would not be interested.'
33
In 1993 she was up for promotion again.134 Once again she was
passed over in favor of two other employees, one an unmarried male and
the other a father. 135 She contacted a senior vice president and told him
128. See Tracy Anbinder Baron, Comment, Keeping Women Out of the Executive
Suite: The Court's Failure to Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L.
REv. 267, 271-72 (1994). Perhaps the marginalization of part-time lawyers can be
attributed to people's preference for colleagues who are similar to themselves. See
id. (discussing disadvantages of women at upper-level professions due to inability
to remain on promotion track). As a result of this bias, "'top executives tend to
promote people into leadership positions who are as much like them as possible'
because they are 'simply more comfortable with and seem to gravitate toward peo-
ple like themselves."' Id. (quoting Basia Hellwig, The Breakthrough Generation: 73
Women Ready to Run Corporate America, WORKING WOMAN, Apr. 1985; at 148).
129. Title VII challenges to unequal pay may also be available. Moreover,
suits contesting unequal benefits would have to be filed under Title VII because
the EPA covers only wages. See Emilie M. Meyer, Note, Employment Law-Title VII-
United States Supreme Court Clarifies Standards for Statistical Evidence and Burdens of
Proof in Private Litigation Under the Disparate Impact Theoy-Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio,109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), 20 SETON HALL L. REv 831, 831 (1990) (noting
that Title VII has been interpreted by Supreme Court to forbid intentional dis-
crimination and use of facially neutral employment practices that adversely affect
protected class); see also Rosemary C. Hunter & Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact
Discrimination: American Oddity or Internationally Accepted Concept?, 19 BERKELEY J.
EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 108, 126 (1988).
130. Deborah L. Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 585, 588
(1996).
131. See Trezza v. The Hartford, Inc., 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 WL 912101, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1998).
132. See id. at *1.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
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she believed that the failure to promote her reflected sex discrimina-
tion.136 Two months later she received a promotion. 13 7
Finally, in 1997, she was not considered for the position of senior
managing attorney despite the fact that she asked to be considered and
had consistently received excellent job evaluations.13 8 Instead the com-
pany considered two men with children, and then offered the job to a
nonmother with less experience than Trezza. 139
Trezza sued, alleging sex discrimination under the so called "sex-plus"
disparate treatment theory.1 40 This theory, first articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in 1971 in Phillips v. Martin Marietta,14 forbids dis-
crimination against mothers even if equal opportunity is offered to
nonmothers.14 2 In Martin Marietta, the employer refused to allow the
mothers of school-aged children to apply for jobs that were open to the
fathers of school-aged children.' 43 The court in Martin Marietta, like the
court in Trezza, held that the fact that men and women without children
were treated the same did not excuse discrimination against mothers; the
Trezza court explicitly rejected Hartford's contention that no sex discrimi-
nation existed because the job in question had been awarded to a wo-
man. 14 4 Trezza pointed out that only seven of the forty-six managing
attorneys at Hartford were women and only three were mothers.' 45 In
contrast, many of the male managing attorneys were fathers.' 46
These new "I had a baby, not a lobotomy" suits have tremendous po-
tential because discrimination against mothers remains very open today.
This is precisely because it is not conceptualized as discrimination. Trezza
and similar suits may have begun to change that, reversing prior cases in
which plaintiffs often lost.
1 47
B. Disparate Impact Suits to Challenge Masculine Ideal Worker Norms
Two different types of lawsuits could challenge masculine ideal
worker norms under Title VII's disparate impact theory. One would focus
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at *2.
139. See id.
140. See id. at *3. Trezza also argued disparate impact theory, which was dis-
missed. There may have been some flaws in the presentation of this theory. It is
difficult to tell from published materials.
141. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
142. See generally id.
143. See id. at *2.
144. See Trezza, 1998 WL 912101, at *6.
145. See id. at *3.
146. See id.
147. See generally Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 1226 (E.D. Mo.
1996), afJ'd, 116 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 1997). For a discussion citing other cases, see
generally Martha Chamallas, Motherhood and Disparate Treatment, 44 VILL. L. REv.
337 (1998).
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on the design of the promotion track in blue- or white-collar jobs. An-
other would contest an employer's decision not to allow part-time work.
Disparate impact suits involving nonfinancial issues entail three steps.
First, the plaintiff must prove that a facially neutral policy has a disparate
impact on women. 148 Such proof might involve a comparison of the sex
composition of the workforce in entry-level positions with that in high-
level positions. If a plaintiff carries her burden of proving disparate im-
pact, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the challenged em-
ployment practice, despite its disparate impact, is required by business
necessity. 14 9 If the employer proves business necessity, a plaintiff can still
win by proving the existence of a less discriminatory alternative (LDA);
that is, an employment practice that will serve the employers' business
goals but will create less of a disparate impact than the challenged practice
or practices.
150
In masculine-ideal worker norm scheduling promotion suits, the key
is to present a vivid picture of how the particular workplace at issue can be
restructured and yet still meet the employer's legitimate business needs. It
would be ideal to have a study by a work/family consultant that shows how
to restructure the particular workplace at issue-after all, reimagined
workplaces are their business. The most important role of such a report is
to help diffuse the heavy (if unofficial) burden imposed by the often ar-
ticulated sense that, although redesigning work places is a worthy good,
"it's just not practical."
A picture of the reimagined workplace is also relevant to several legal
inquiries. The first concerns an ambiguous provision of Title VII which
may require a plaintiff to present a viable proposal that the employer re-
fused to adopt early on in the lawsuit.'5 1 The provision in question states
148. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (holding that liability
is established when facially neutral policy affects members of protected class in
significantly discriminatory manner); see also Gilda Vinzulis Boyer, Employment
Law-Redefining the Evidentiary Burdens in Title VII Disparate Impact Employment Dis-
crimination Cases: Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 15 J. CoRP. L. 573, 573-74
(1990) (citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)). The em-
ployee must provide statistical evidence to establish that "a facially neutral employ-
ment practice has a significant discriminatory impact against the employee." Id.
149. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993) (stating that
once plaintiff establishes disparate impact burden shifts to defendant to prove
business necessity); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989)
(same). The Wards Cove Court did not require an employer to show the practices
at issue were essential or indispensable to satisfy the business necessity test. See id.
at 2126 (noting low burden for employers).
150. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) (stating that
plaintiff bears burden of establishing less discriminatory alternatives); Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 495 (1975) (same). The basic format for dispa-
rate impact suits involving financial issues, as when paying women in a predomi-
nantly female part-time track a lower wage rate for part-time work, combine
requirements from the EPA and from Title VII, as well as complex threshold issues
that are beyond the scope of this article.
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2) (k) (1) (1991).
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that disparate impact is established if a plaintiff proves an alternative em-
ployment practice "and the respondent refuses to adopt" it.15 2 A consult-
ant's report can also help to rebut an employer's claim that business
necessity requires that current practices remain unchanged, as well as,
help to establish the existence of less discriminatory alternatives. In some
cases, the relevant data for restructuring may be available from first-gener-
ation mommy track, work/family policies, often implemented as the result
of a consultant's report analyzing what policies are practical and desirable
from a business standpoint.
1. Challenging the Design of the Promotion Track
Consider a large corporation that hires roughly equal proportions of
men and women at the entry level, but has a promotion track that yields
disproportionate numbers of men in top-level positions. This must be a
very common situation, considering that ninety-five percent of upper-level
management practices are staffed by white males. 15 3 We have previously
examined the policies that contribute to this situation. Quite often the
promotion track requires the prototypical executive schedule. Perhaps it
also requires relocation. Other factors may play a role as well. In the blue-
collar context, male physical norms may also play a role in addition to the
norms that have evolved as a result of men's access to a flow of family work
from women: large amounts of mandatory overtime, training programs
that occur in overtime, stringent sick leave policies that effectively pre-
clude people with primary responsibility for child care and job ladders
that severely penalize work interruptions.
Let us first consider a white-collar promotion suit. After generating a
picture of a restructured workplace, a plaintiff could file a suit alleging
that the design of the promotion track has a disparate impact on women.
Proof would first require her to establish that, for example, women hold
fifty percent of entry-level but only twenty percent of the top-four corpo-
rate levels, and only five percent of top management positions.
The next question is whether the relative paucity of women at the top
is caused by the actions of the employer or by women's choices to quit.'5 4
An employer faced with such a suit can be expected to argue that,
whatever the documented disparities between men and women, they are
caused not by discrimination but by women's lack of interest in the jobs in
question. 15 5 The causation requirement in disparate impact suits was
codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which requires plaintiffs to estab-
152. Id.
153. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CON-
FLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 191, 220 (1999).
154. For a further discussion of the implications of the use of choice lan-
guage, see supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
155. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 322 (7th Cir. 1988)
(identifying "women's lack of interest" as reason for their under-representation in
certain positions).
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lish that the challenged policies caused the impact documented.1 56 This
argument over causation then takes us back to the analysis of choice.
When women use choice rhetoric, they speak as people struggling with the
constraints handed to them by a world they did not invent. Courts consid-
ering Title VII claims are in a different position; their mandate is to con-
sider whether the constraints women face constitute discrimination. If
they do, the fact that many women may have internalized those constraints
does not provide employers with an excuse for continuing the
discrimination.
The third legal requirement is that a plaintiff must articulate specific
policies which produce the discrimination alleged. 15 7 One example is the
common law-firm policy that takes part-time workers off the partnership
track. Even if the impact in question is produced by an integrated set of
policies that cannot be separated, a plaintiff may be able to challenge the
entire integrated set by showing that the "bottom-line" results are
discriminatory.1 58
Once an employee has (1) offered statistics proving disparate impact,
(2) refuted the employer's argument that this predicament could only be
the result of women's own choices and (3) delineated the policy or poli-
cies at issue, she has proven her prima facie case. The burden of proof
then shifts to the defendant, who is given the opportunity to show that the
policy that produces the disparate impact is a business necessity. 15'
The law on business necessity is complex. In 1971, the Supreme
Court held that an employer had the burden of proving that the chal-
lenged policy was 'Job related" and had "a manifest relationship to the
employment in question.' 60 This decision originally placed a heavy bur-
156. See David Charny & G. Martin Gulati, Efficiency Wages, Tournaments, and
Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for "High-Level"Jobs, 33
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 57,101 n.151 (1998) (stressing importance of causation in
disparate impact suits). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 exempts plaintiffs from iden-
tifying a particular employment practice that causes disparate impact when the
process is not conducive to "separation for analysis." See id. (discussing Act's
exemption).
157. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k) (1) (1991) (noting change). The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 added the requirement that "the complaining party... demonstrate
that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact
.
Id.
158. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k) (1) (1991). Note, however, under this section,
that "if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a
respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis,
the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice."). Id.;
see also MICHAELJ. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DIscRIMI-
NATION 456-59 (4th ed. 1997).
159. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (1994) (conditioning validity of
claimant's case on employer's failure to "demonstrate that the challenged practice
is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity").
160. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (stating that
"if an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to
be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited"). The Court found that
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den on the employer. Eighteen years later, however, the Supreme Court
greatly strengthened the employer's hand in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio.161 There, the Court required only that the employer be able to
articulate a reasonable 'justification for his use of the challenged prac-
tice." 162 The Court stated that "there is no requirement that the chal-
lenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business
for it to pass muster."'1 63
Congress overturned Ward's Cove with the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.164 Unfortunately, it did so in language that is so ambiguous
that the current test for business necessity remains unclear. 165 It appears,
however, that the current test is closer to the previous requirement that a
discriminatory practice be essential to the business. 166 Assuming this is
true, many current practices would likely not be justifiable as business ne-
cessity. The use of masculine norms in job descriptions of high-level white
collar work strongly suggests that, at best, the executive schedule and
other practices "are not actually job related but [are] merely 'corporate
convenient.' "167 Indeed, such policies may not be as convenient to the
corporation as is often assumed. Flexible policies, properly implemented,
the high school completion requirement and general intelligence test imposed by
the employer "[did] not bear a demonstrable relationship to successful perform-
ance of the jobs" where the employer had adopted the policies "without meaning-
ful study" and employees hired prior to their adoption "who ha[d] not completed
high school or taken the tests ... perform[ed] satisfactorily." Id.
161. 490 U.S. 642 (1989), rev'd in part by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(k)
(1994).
162. Id. at 659.
163. Id.
164. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 3, 105 Stat. 1071(1991) ("The purposes of this Act are ... to codify the concepts of 'business neces-
sity' and 'job related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio.") (citations omitted); H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 28 (1991) ("For eighteen
years, the Criggs rule of business necessity operated to remove these unnecessary
barriers. The Committee finds that there is a compelling need to overrule the
Wards Cove decision and to restore the rule of Griggs and its progeny.").
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (1994) (providing no definition for
terms 'Job related" and "business necessity").
166. See 137 CONG. REc. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) ("The final compro-
mise on S. 1745 agreed to by several Senate sponsors, including Senators Danforth,
Kennedy, and Dole, and the Administration states that with respect to Wards
Cove--business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice-the exclusive
legislative history is as follows: The terms 'business necessity' and 'job related' are
intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., .and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio.") (citations omitted). As enunciated by the Court in Griggs,
an employer has the "burden of showing that any given requirement ... [has] a
manifest relationship to the employment in question." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (em-
phasis added).
167. Lo=r BAiLYN, BREAKING THE MoLD 77 (1993) (quoting Virginia E.
Schein).
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would improve productivity and lower the costs of absenteeism, turnover
and recruitment in many instances.
A crucial issue concerns the role of costs in establishing business ne-
cessity because an employer can be expected to argue that promoting only
people who work long hours ensures maximum profits. Employers are, of
course, entitled to engage in cost containment; that is a crucial part of
management's job. The issue becomes whether employers are entitled to
structure their cost containment measures in ways that systematically dis-
advantage women. The alternative is to contain costs in ways that do not
perpetuate practices which produce "built in headwinds" for anyone with-
out the social resources typically available to many, although not all,
men. 168 If plaintiffs follow the proposal I present here, the per-hour costs
of full- and part-time employees should be similar, provided that part-time
workers request only proportionate pay, benefits and advancement. Never-
theless, federal courts have not consistently treated the issue of whether or
not costs are relevant in determinations of business necessity.
169
If an employer is successful in proving business necessity, a plaintiff
can still win if she can prove the existence of a "less discriminatory alterna-
tive;" that is, an alternative way of structuring the promotion track that has
a less harsh effect on female employees.170 A plaintiff's reimagined work-
place becomes directly relevant in this final stage because a plaintiff em-
ployee may be able to prevail if she can show specific changes that are
feasible and less discriminatory. 1
7
'
2. Individual Redesign Suits
Another type of lawsuit would involve a full-time female employee
who, after working for a number of years in her job, is denied a request to
have her schedule changed to part-time. I know from my experience that
168. See EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 10666, 48 F.3d 494, 602 (1st
Cir. 1995) (citing Griggs holding that absence of discriminatory intent does not
justify procedures that act as "built-in headwinds" for minority groups); Anderson
v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277, 1302 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Griggs hold-
ing finding unlawful "mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability"); Butler v. Home Depot,
Nos. C-94-4335 SI, C-95-2182 SI, 1997 WL 605754, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1997)
(citing Griggs requirement that an employer's practice need only act as "built-in
headwinds" rather than have discriminatory intent).
169. For a discussion of the role of costs, see BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL.,
SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAw 871-72 (1996).
170. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658 (1989) (noting
that second phase of disparate impact cases contain two components: "first, a con-
sideration of the justifications an employer offers for his use of these practices;...
and second, the availability of alternative practices to achieve the same business
ends, with less racial impact").
171. See International Union v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 901 (7th
Cir. 1989) ("The absence of economically and technologically feasible alternatives
to [defendant's] policy also supports a bona fide occupational qualification
determination.").
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this is a common situation among federal employees in Washington, D.C.
No doubt it exists elsewhere as well.
An ideal plaintiff in this type of suit would be someone who has been
working for the employer for many years and has consistently received
excellent work evaluations. In addition, this plaintiff would need to pres-
ent a plan for part-time employment that is clearly workable and meets the
employer's needs. Again, a work/family consultant may be helpful in
framing a proposed plan.
Proof of disparate impact would require such a plaintiff to show that a
large number of employees (disproportionately women) have requested to
have their hours cut, that they left when these requests were turned down,
and that a disproportionately low number of women now hold the jobs at
issue. The actual workplace data, which provides evidence of disparate
impact, may be hard to compile. In my experience, however, certain key
women have served as mentors for women seeking part-time work in spe-
cific agencies of the federal government; these women serve as an institu-
tional memory of requests denied. Similar situations may well exist
elsewhere. In lawsuits of this type, the issues of business necessity and less
discriminatory alternatives will be much the same as in the promotion suits
previously described. 172
The challenges involved in litigating work/family conflict would be
lessened if a proposed amendment to the Equal Pay Act were adopted. In
1994, the Contingent Workforce Equity Act (CWEA) proposed to amend
the Equal Pay Act to prohibit employers from paying part-time employees
at a rate different from that paid to full-time employees for equal work in
jobs, the performance of which requires equal skills, effort and responsi-
bility, and which are performed under similar working conditions. 17 3
172. For further discussion of promotion suits under Title VII, see supra notes
130 through 159 and accompanying text.
173. See S. 2504, § 102 (1994) (addressing issues arising from replacement of
full-time employees with part-time, temporary and other contingent employees).
The Act states in pertinent part:
(g) (1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this
section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such em-
ployees are employed, between employees on the basis of employment
status by paying wages to part-time or temporary employees in such estab-
lishment at a rate less than the rate at which the employer pays wages to
full-time employees in such establishment for equal work on jobs the per-
formance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and
which are performed under similar working conditions, except where
such payment is made pursuant to-
(A) a seniority system;
(B) a merit system;
(C) a system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of produc-
tion; or
(D) a differential based on any other factor other than employment
status.
CONG. REc. S14247 (daily ed. Oct. 5,1994) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) (Con-
tingent Workfare Equity Act).
[Vol. 44: p. 305
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Now that unions have begun to take an interest in the issue of equal pay
rates for part-time work, the time may be ripe to resurrect this proposed
statute. The International Labour Office's proposed convention on part-
time work has many of the same provisions as CWEA, including its guaran-
tees that part- and full-time workers receive equal wage rates.174
VII. BUT THAT'S IMPOSSIBLE!
The early proponents of a Title VII remedy for sexual harassment
were told that because the practice was so pervasive and of such long
standing, because drawing a line between the permissible and the imper-
missible was so insurmountable, because the problems of proof were so
complex and because the issue was so far from the core prohibitions of
Title VII, nothing could or should be done by the courts.1 75
Obviously, suing your employer is not the ideal mechanism of social
change. Law suits are costly in several ways. Litigation is itself costly. Su-
ing your employer may also be emotionally draining in the short run and
may hurt your career in the long run-who wants to hire a
"troublemaker"?' 76
Nonetheless, legal liability has a remarkable ability to focus the mind.
Sexual harassment has been around a long time; employers became seri-
ous about its damaging effects only when they faced legal liability.177 The
threat of legal liability, rather than the damages awarded in individual law-
suits, is what leads to social change.
Until now, discussion of "family friendly" policies has largely been lim-
ited to the realm of management consulting, which has emphasized the
potential bottom-line benefits of flexibility. 178 Work/family consultants
174. See International Labour Conference, 81st Session, Report IV (2B), Part-
time work (discussing proposed amendment).
175. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orienta-
tion: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 81-82
(1995).
176. SeeJill Andrews, National and International Sources of Women's Right to Equal
Employment Opportunities: Equality in Law Versus Equality in Fact, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 413, 439 (1994). As the author notes, "while there is not the same cultural
aversion to litigation as in Japan, an American woman faces the risk of being la-
beled a troublemaker if she decides to use the courts to enforce her rights. This
label may even prevent her from obtaining other employment." Id.; see alsoJudith
I. Avner, Sexual Harassment: Building a Consensus for Change, 3 KANJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y
57, 69 (1994) ("While many attributed these losses to direct retaliation by superi-
ors who were the harassers, other victims said they were subjected to what they
perceived as company-wide 'blacklisting' in which they were labeled as troublemak-
ers and found their careers dead-ended.").
177. See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DIScRIMINATION
LAW 195 (1997). "[I] t is settled that an effective policy and procedure against sex-
ual harassment avoids employer liability for harassment by subordinate employees
and for environmental harassment by supervisors." Id.
178. See The Work-Family Equation: More Companies Are Finding It's Good Business
to Consider The Family Needs of Their Employees, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss DISPATCH,
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have tried for years to convince employers to adopt "family friendly" poli-
cies on the grounds that such policies improve employee retention, de-
crease training and recruiting costs, and boost employee productivity. 179
The result has been a generation of "mommy track" policies that offer
scheduling flexibility at the cost of permanent marginalization. 180
What we need is not a mommy track, but a work paradigm restruc-
tured around values people hold in family life. This would not only end
systematic discrimination against women; it would also empower fathers to
break away from the provider role domesticity scripts for them. Both for
basic economic reasons and for the reason that masculinity tends to be
measured by the size of a paycheck, most fathers will not feel free to con-
tribute equally to family work if they have to pay the price mothers cur-
rently pay. 18 1 Once the marginalization of committed parents is
recognized as discrimination against women, the result will be to unbend
gender for men as well.
For over a decade, work/family consultants have articulated a new
vision of restructured work, but mothers have never had a cause of action.
Courts should give them one.182
Nov. 26, 1990, at IF; Work & Family Benefits, Inc., Why Invest in This Employee
Benefit? (visited Oct. 31, 1997) <http://www.wfbenefits.com/WHYINVST.HTM>.
179. See SALLY COBERLY & GAIL G. HUNT, WASHINGTON BUSINESS GROUP, THE
METLIFE STUDY OF EMPLOYER COSTS FOR WORKING CAREGivERS 6-8 (1995); see also
Phyllis H. Raabe, The Organizational Effects of Workplace Family Policies: Past Weak-
nesses and Recent Progress Toward Improved Research, 11J. FAM. ISSUES 477, 482 (1990).
But see Fuller v. GTE Corp., 926 F. Supp. 653, 658 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) ("Title VII
does not automatically require a family friendly workplace.").
180. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, TIME BIND 27 (1997); Deborah L.
Rhode, Fleeing Home for the Comforts of an Office, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 6, 1997, at A23;
Debra B. Schwartz, An Examination of the Impact of Family Friendly Policies on the Glass
Ceiling 5, 18 (Jan. 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with Federal Glass Ceiling
Commission).
181. See Case, supra note 175, at 19 ("Masculinity was associated with career
success in both sexes and with desirable qualities in a wide variety of employment
contexts, particularly for those jobs accorded high status and high pay in our soci-
ety."); Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 CAL.
L. REv. 1151, 1152 n.2 (1995) (citingJERRYA.JACOBS, REVOLVING DOORS: SEX SE,-
REGATION AND WOMEN'S CAREERS 151-55 (1989)).
182. For patient assistance in helping me frame these lawsuits and proposals,
thanks to Martha Chamallas, Stanford Ross, Susan Ross, Michael Selmi and Marley
Weiss. The mistakes that remain, of course, are mine.
Though I have focused on litigation in the text, to be effective litigation must
be part of an integrated approach that includes community-based programs such
as that described in Sylvia Law, Girls Can't Be Plumbers-Affirmative Action for Women
in Construction: Beyond Goals and Quotas, 24 HARv. Cr. RTs.-CWV. LIB. 45 (1989).
She suggests that "three components are critical to assuring equality of opportu-
nity ... 1) executive oversight, especially the enforcement of federal . . . compli-
ance guidelines; 2) judicial oversight, including vigorous application of Title VII's
prohibition against job requirements that are discriminatory in effect and cannot
be justified as job-related; and 3) well constructed, aggressive community-based
programs .. . which open opportunities so that goals may be met." Id.
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